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Nominalization is the process which removes abstract objects from our scientific theories. 
But what makes a proposed nominalization a good or successful one? In the paper “Is It 
Possible to Nominalize Quantum Mechanics,” Otávio Bueno develops criteria for any 
successful nominalization. In the present work, I discuss one of these criteria that I call the 
“interpretation criterion.” It claims that a nominalization of a scientific theory should be 
neutral with regards to the interpretations of that theory. I argue that the interpretation 
criterion is problematic, and that it should be replaced with an alternative criterion of 
nominalization. I first explicate the background for understanding Bueno’s goal in 
establishing his criteria for nominalization programs and describe the criteria themselves. 
Then, I launch my critique against the interpretation criterion by arguing that it makes 
nominalization impossible, even when specified in its best form. Lastly, I offer my positive 
picture of the appropriate relationship between nominalization and interpretation. The 
positive picture is, roughly, that we should not seek global nominalization criteria as Bueno 
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 Nominalization is the process which removes abstract objects from our scientific 
theories. But what makes a proposed nominalization a good or successful one? In the paper 
“Is It Possible to Nominalize Quantum Mechanics,” Otávio Bueno develops criteria for any 
successful nominalization. One of these criteria I will call the “interpretation criterion.” It 
claims that a nominalization of a scientific theory should be neutral with regards to the 
interpretations of that theory. In this paper, I argue that the interpretation criterion is 
problematic, and that it should be replaced with an alternative criterion of nominalization.  
In the following section, I explicate the background for understanding Bueno’s goal 
in establishing his criteria for nominalization programs and describe the criteria 
themselves. In section three, I launch my critique against the interpretation criterion by 
arguing that it makes nominalization impossible, even when specified in its best form. In 
section four, I offer my positive picture of the appropriate relationship between 
nominalization and interpretation. The positive picture is, roughly, that we should not seek 
global nominalization criteria as Bueno does, but instead should try to nominalize our 
scientific theories in a piecemeal fashion. 
II. Background 
In this section, I will briefly describe abstract objects and why one may wish to rid 
them from one’s ontology. Then, I will describe the dialectic that starts with the Quine-
Putnam indispensability argument and ends with Bueno’s nominalization criteria in an 
effort to show why Bueno introduced his criteria. 
Abstract objects are traditionally characterized as acausal and aspatiotemporal 
entities. They occupy one side of the abstracta/concreta distinction, where concrete objects 
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are any objects that are causal and spatiotemporal. Some philosophers dispute the 
tenability of this distinction and others disagree with the traditional characterization of 
abstract objects as acausal and aspatiotemporal.1 These debates will not be taken up in the 
present work. Some candidate abstract objects include possible worlds, propositions, 
musical works, and mathematical entities. The abstract objects focused on in this paper are 
mathematical entities, like numbers, sets, and vector spaces. Platonists accept abstract 
objects into their ontology, nominalists reject them.  
Why would one want to reject them? There have been a few reasons put forward to 
reject mathematical objects. Firstly, mathematical objects seem to be epistemologically 
inaccessible, so we should not countenance them.2 This epistemological argument against 
mathematical objects has been made in two forms, but the most developed form (Hartry 
Field’s) proceeds in the following way: 
1. Mathematicians are reliable, in the sense that for almost every 
mathematical sentence S, if mathematicians accept S, then S is true. 
2. For a belief in mathematics to be justified, it must at least in principle 
be possible to explain the reliability described in Premise 1. 
3. If mathematical platonism is true, then this reliability cannot be 
explained, even in principle.3 
 
That is, given that mathematical objects are causally isolated from us, the reliability of 
mathematicians’ mathematical beliefs is inexplicable. Given this inexplicability, our beliefs 
in mathematics are unjustified.4 Since we want to preserve the justification of our beliefs in 
mathematics, this epistemological argument is taken as a strike against the platonist view.  
                                                           
1 For an example of someone who questions the distinction see Lewis (1986), pp. 81-90. 
2 See Benacerraf (1973) and Field (1989).  
3 Adapted from Section 3.1. of Linnebo (2018). 
4 This, of course, assumes a tight connection between the inexplicability of reliability and a lack of 
justification (premise 2 above). I do not necessarily endorse this premise, but I will include 
Linnebo’s (2018) defense of it: “If the reliability of some belief formation procedure could not even 
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Secondly, since abstract objects are acausal “they are causally gratuitous in standard 
physical explanations.”5 That is, since abstract objects are acausal and scientific 
explanations should be causal, mathematical objects are gratuitous in scientific 
explanations. Thirdly, mathematical objects are arbitrary “since units, frames, etc., are 
entirely conventional and may vary from one representation to the other, so long as certain 
lawlike features remain invariant.”6 Given the arbitrariness of what mathematical objects 
we choose to employ in scientific explanation, mathematical objects seem to be doing little 
to no explanatory work and therefore do not need to be posited. These second and third 
problems are very closely related: because intrinsic, non-arbitrary, causal explanations are 
preferable, ceteris paribus, to extrinsic, arbitrary, non-causal ones, nominalist explanations 
are preferable to standard ones appealing to mathematical entities. Because of problems 
like these many philosophers have viewed abstract objects as worrisome entities to be 
rejected if possible. I will not discuss these arguments in any more detail; they are present 
merely to provide an understanding of why one may wish to be a nominalist. Now, I will 
present what many take to be the best reason to be a platonist in an effort to show the 
import of Bueno’s nominalization criteria.  
In his 1980 Science without Numbers, Hartry Field began the contemporary 
nominalist program in the philosophy of mathematics. His goal was to argue for 
nominalism by arguing against what he and many others took to be the strongest argument 
                                                           
in principle be explained, then the procedure would seem to work purely by chance, thus 
undercutting any justification we have for the beliefs produced in this way.”   
5 Liston (1993), pp. 454.. This is based on Field (1980), pp. 43-46 . 
6 Ibid. This is based on Field (1980), pp. 45-46.  
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to the contrary — the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. The Quine-Putnam 
indispensability argument states: 
1. Our best scientific theories employ mathematical objects indispensably. 
2. We should believe in the existence of what our best scientific theories employ 
indispensably. 
3. Therefore, we should believe that mathematical objects exist.7 
Field argued for nominalism by rejecting premise 1. He attempted to show that 
mathematical objects are dispensable in science by providing a nominalization of science. 
To begin the process of nominalizing the whole of science, and to show that such a task is 
possible, he successfully nominalized one part of classical mechanics: Newtonian 
Gravitation Theory.8 
 It might be useful at this point, to offer a quick example of nominalization so that the 
reader may more fully understand what Field partially accomplished with regards to 
classical mechanics. Take a scientific theory that references the real numbers when 
describing the distances between physical objects. A nominalization will get rid of the real 
numbers in the distance-talk by employing (as Field does) Hilbert’s synthetic (axiomatic, 
coordinate-free) geometry. Taking point, betweeness, and congruence as primitive relations, 
one can build a geometry that allows one to state, without real numbers, all the distance 
relations one could state using real numbers. Hence, once this sort of nominalization is 
                                                           
7 See Quine (1948) and Putnam (1975).  




accomplished one can make a scientific theory that does the same scientific work as the 
former without the need to quantify over real numbers.9 
Soon after the publication of Science without Numbers, however, David Malament 
objected to Field’s project by claiming, among other things, that Field’s nominalist strategy 
could not be extended to quantum mechanics (hereafter QM) because of the nature of QM 
and its fundamental mathematical framework — the Hilbert space. As Malament writes: 
Quantum mechanics is even a more recalcitrant example than Hamiltonian 
mechanics. Here I do not really see how Field can get started at all. I suppose 
one can think of a theory as determining a set of models — each a Hilbert 
space. But what form would the recovery (i.e., representation) theorem take? 
The only possibility that comes to mind is a theorem of the sort sought by 
Jauch, Piron, et al. They start with “propositions” (or “eventualities”) and 
lattice-theoretic relations as primitive, and then seek to prove that the lattice 
of propositions is necessarily isomorphic to the lattice of subspaces of some 
Hilbert space. But of course no theorem of this sort would be of any use to 
Field. What could be worse than propositions (or eventualities).10 
 
The Hilbert space is a phase space which provides a distinctive challenge to Field’s 
program because the unit vectors represent the possible states (pure states) of a quantum 
mechanical system. Malament claimed that Field’s nominalization strategy could not be 
extended to QM because Field would have to find some nominalistically acceptable entity 
to replace these possibility-related subspaces of the Hilbert space. But the only obvious 
things which could be used to accomplish that task are “propositions” or “eventualities,” 
which are just as abstract, and thus just as problematic to the nominalist, as mathematical 
objects.  
                                                           
9 The success of a nominalization like this is contingent on a representation theorem being proved. 
A representation theorem is a theorem that states all of the abstract structures are isomorphic to 
the concrete structures being employed. 
10 Malament, (1982): pp. 533-534. Italics are Malament’s. 
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In 1998, Mark Balaguer developed a partial nominalization of QM taking into 
account Malament’s objection. He removed propositions and eventualities and claimed that 
“quantum probability statements are about physically real propensities of quantum 
systems.”11 He replaced abstract objects in QM with physically real properties — 
propensities of, and propensity-relations between, quantum systems. These propensities 
are nominalistically acceptable (unlike propositions and eventualities), Balaguer claimed, 
just like any other physically real property such as spin, charge, or mass. 
This brings us to Bueno’s 2003 paper, “Is It Possible To Nominalize Quantum 
Mechanics?” In it, Bueno claims that Balaguer’s proposed nominalization of QM fails 
because it faces a dilemma given two criteria for nominalization introduced by Bueno. Here 
are those criteria: 
(1)A nominalization strategy should be neutral. That is, the nominalistic 
version of a theory T’ should not settle issues left open by T. Otherwise, 
instead of providing a nominalization of T, we may end up developing a rival 
theory T’—if new empirical consequences are obtained from T’. Alternatively, 
if no new empirical consequences are obtained, but T’ settles issues that T 
leaves open, T’ ends up providing a different interpretation of T, instead of 
simply developing a nominalistic version of T (that is, a version of T that does 
not presuppose the existence of abstract entities). (2) A nominalization 
strategy should be ontologically parsimonious. That is, it should not 
presuppose nominalistically unacceptable items.12 
 
Bueno claims that Balaguer’s proposed nominalization faces a dilemma. It either 
presupposes entities which some interpretations of QM would deny or at least not 
presuppose, (specifically, Bueno has in mind: Bohmian mechanics, van Fraassen’s modal 
interpretation, and hidden variables views), or it does not presuppose entities that these 
                                                           
11 Balaguer, (1998): pp. 120. 
12 Bueno, (2003): pp. 1425. Italics are Bueno’s. 
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interpretations would deny.13 As it stands, Balaguer’s nominalization does presuppose 
entities which these interpretations would reject, because each of them explains the 
probabilistic nature of QM in a way that differs from relying on physically real propensities 
being the explanantia. Since Balaguer’s nominalization makes these illegitimate 
presuppositions and commitments with regards to these interpretations, it fails to “capture 
the underdetermination of interpretations typical of QM” and it will therefore be a new 
interpretation of QM, and not merely a nominalistic version of QM. That is, Balaguer’s 
nominalization fails the interpretation criterion. Moreover, according to Bueno, in order for 
Balaguer’s nominalization to be made neutral with regards to these interpretations, 
Balaguer would have to find some concrete counterpart other than physically real 
propensities to do the nominalizing work; and what could those be? Bueno’s point is that 
Balaguer cannot make a nominalization that is interpretatively neutral with respect to all of 
these interpretations without invoking something like propositions or eventualities. 
Therefore, Balaguer’s proposed nominalization is caught in a dilemma. This is Bueno’s 
argument against Balaguer’s nominalization, but let us return to the criteria that support 
the argument.14 
Notice Bueno’s first criterion comes in two parts. The first part claims that a 
nominalization, T’, should not deliver empirical results that differ from the non-
nominalized scientific theory, T, that is to be nominalized. This could mean that T’ should 
                                                           
13 The use of “presupposition” language will become clear in the following section. I’m focusing my 
exegesis of Bueno’s interpretation criterion based on his employment of it on Bueno (2003), pp. 
1433-1435. 
14 I accept the second criterion (the ontologically parsimonious one), so I will not go into further 
detail or offer a critique of it. 
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not offer a new empirical result that T was silent with respect to or it could mean that T’ 
should not offer an empirical result that contradicts T.15  
Either way, this part of the criterion is plausible. This part of the criterion simply 
amounts to Field’s claim that the mathematical theory being nominalized must be a 
conservative extension of the nominalization. This means that any good nominalization T’ of 
any standard platonistic theory T will be such that E is an empirical consequence of T iff the 
nominalistic counterpart of E is a consequence of T’.16 When Field nominalized Newtonian 
Gravitation Theory, it would have been exceedingly problematic if his nominalization 
offered empirical results about gravity that were not already present in classical mechanics 
or that contradicted the empirical results of our extended experimentation with classical 
mechanics.  
However, Bueno’s first criterion also comes with a second part: 
[I]f no new empirical consequences are obtained, but T’ settles issues that T 
leaves open, T’ ends up providing a different interpretation of T, instead of 
simply developing a nominalistic version of T (that is, a version of T that does 
not presuppose the existence of abstract entities).17  
 
This second part of this criterion says that the nominalization of a theory must be 
interpretively neutral with respect to the original theory, because if not, then the 
                                                           
15 What do I mean by claiming a nominalization can yield an empirical result? One might think that 
nominalizations are (plausibly) a priori or non-empirical endeavors and so a nominalization should 
not yield an empirical result. Nominalizations can yield empirical results in the following way: T’ 
yields all and only the nominalistic counterparts of the empirical consequences of T. The point in 
the text is just that T’ should neither yield a nominalistic version of an empirical result not 
originally present in the theory nor should T’ yield a nominalistic version of an empirical result that 
contradicts T. 
16 Field describes the conservative property by saying that mathematics is conservative in that: 
“any inference from nominalistic premises to a nominalistic conclusion that can be made with the 
help of mathematics could be made (usually more long-windedly) without it.” See Field (1980), pp. 
x-xi. 
17 Bueno, (2003): pp. 1425. Italics are Bueno’s. 
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nominalization is a new interpretation of the scientific theory and not merely a 
nominalistic version of it. I will call this thesis the interpretation criterion. I think this 
criterion is problematic and why I think so will come to light in the following section.  
III. The Interpretation Criterion Asks the Impossible 
What does it mean to say that a nominalization of a scientific theory cannot settle 
issues that the theory leaves open? Specifically, what does it mean to say that a 
nominalization of QM cannot settle issues that QM leaves open? The interpretation 
criterion is too underspecified in Bueno’s own work, so in this section, I will briefly identify 
some things Bueno cannot mean by the interpretation criterion before identifying the most 
charitable way the interpretation criterion can be read.18 I will then argue that this most 
charitable specification of the criterion makes nominalization an impossible task, and 
therefore it should be replaced with an alternative criterion of nominalization. 
 If the interpretation criterion is too strong, it rules out nominalization, in the most 
obvious way, from the beginning. This is because a theory without abstract objects is 
interpretatively different from a theory with abstract objects. If this is what Bueno means 
by the interpretation criterion, then nominalization is ruled out from the start. This, of 
course, is not what Bueno means given that he wants to accept the possibility of merely 
nominalistic versions of theories. 
If the interpretation criterion is too weak, then it allows Balaguer’s proposed 
nominalization to succeed. But, of course, Bueno developed the criterion to argue against 
Balaguer’s nominalization. This is obviously not what Bueno has in mind with the 
                                                           
18 I’ve already hinted at what I take to be the best reading of Bueno’s criterion in my description of 
his dilemma against Balaguer in the previous section. It says a neutral interpretation will not 
presuppose any entities other interpretations may deny (or deny the fundamentality of). 
10 
 
interpretation criterion. I include mention of a weak version of the interpretation criterion 
here just to show that the most charitable specification of Bueno’s interpretation criterion 
must be, in terms of logical strength, between the too strong and too weak versions I have 
just offered. Let me now offer what I take to be the most charitable reading of Bueno’s 
interpretation criterion.19 
 I will call the most charitable specification of the interpretation criterion the “core 
theory” specification. The core theory specification says that a good nominalization of QM 
is one that nominalizes the “core theory” of QM, while remaining silent with respect to all of 
the issues that the interpretations of QM disagree about. There are two clarificatory points 
which need to be addressed before moving on. One, which interpretations are included in 
this specification of the criterion? I think Bueno’s criterion would have to include all of the 
currently defensible interpretations of QM (Bohmian mechanics, GRW, Everettian 
mechanics, van Fraassen’s modal interpretation, etc.) for the criterion to do the work it is 
intended to do against Balaguer. Two, what is this core theory? The core theory (hereafter 
Q) is the minimally interpreted shared core of QM. It has as its parts some postulates, and a 
minimal interpretation of those postulates that assigns them a physical world meaning.20 Q 
                                                           
19 There are also a few other uncharitable specifications of the interpretation criterion in the logical 
space that will not be discussed in the body of the work. For example, one possible specification of 
the criterion says a nominalization should be interpretation-free. But, this specification is also 
obviously faulty given the definitions of theory on either the syntactic or semantic views of theory 
structure: a scientific theory on either conception must include an interpretive element.   
20 The standard textbook statement of Q is that Q is a set of the following 4 statements: 
1. Every physical system is associated with a Hilbert Space, every unit vector in the space 
corresponds to a possible pure state of the system, and every possible pure state, to some 
vector in the space. 
2. Hermitian operators in the Hilbert space associated with a system represent physical 




would have to, minimally, say something about the probabilistic structures of quantum 
events (since Q is partially represented by the platonistic Hilbert space). Let Qin represent 
the currently defensible interpretations of QM (for example, Qi1 could represent the 
Bohmian interpretation, Qi2 could represent the modal interpretation, etc.). Each Qin 
extends Q in different ways for each interpretation; that is, each Qin embeds Q in a richer 
world with more mathematical formalism and physical interpretation of that formalism 
than what is present in Q. Suppose now that we can nominalize Q as a theory, QN, such that 
for any nominalistic sentence ϕ: if (QN+M) ⊢ ϕ then QN ⊢ ϕ (where M is the original 
mathematics present in Q). Then, Bueno’s criterion (under this best specification I am 
offering) claims that QN must be compatible with every Qin (except for not having the 
mathematical consequences of the latter) in the following sense: QN must not presuppose 
any entities that any Qin would deny. And since Q must say something about the event-
probabilities of quantum systems, QN must tell a story about event-probabilities of 
quantum systems in a way that does not presuppose any entities any Qin may deny.21  
                                                           
3. The Hilbert space associated with a complex system is the tensor product of those 
associated with the simple systems (in the standard, non-relativistic, theory: the individual 
particles of which it is composed). 
4. Given the state of a system at t and the forces and constraints to which it is subject, there is 
an equation, Schrödinger's equation, that (deterministically) gives the state at any other 
time U|vt> → |vt′>. 
Some interpretations share a 5th statement: 
5. Collapse postulate: Carrying out a "measurement" of an observable B on a system in a state 
|A> has the effect of collapsing the system into a B-eigenstate corresponding to the 
eigenvalue observed. 
I take this formulation of the statements almost exactly from Ismael’s “Quantum Mechanics,” 
(2015). 
Not every currently defensible interpretation of QM will agree with all of these statements as 
explicitly stated, but most do, and all of them agree with most of it.  
21 What do I mean by “event-probabilities”? I mean probabilities that a quantum system will be in a 
particular state when measured. (The soon-to-be-made point in the main text is that some QM 
interpretations claim that these are fundamental features of the world and other interpretations 
12 
 
Balaguer’s nominalization fails, according to Bueno, because the things it introduces 
to nominalize Q (that is, to solve Malament’s worry), propensities, are posits that several 
other QM interpretations would deny the existence of. That is, Balaguer’s QN introduces a 
thing that some Qin’s do not presuppose. More precisely, according to Bueno, Balaguer’s 
nominalization fails because it introduces propensities as the things which nominalistically 
underwrite the probabilistic structure of QM, but Bohmian mechanics, the modal 
interpretation, and hidden variables views each deal with the probabilistic structure of QM 
in ways that deny that propensities exist or do the fundamental work Balaguer claims they 
do. That is, these interpretations do not presuppose the existence of real propensities in 
nature. So, putting the pieces together, the best reading of Bueno’s criterion claims that a 
good nominalization of QM is a nominalization which nominalizes the core of QM by 
explaining the event-probabilities in QM (recovering the Hilbert space in nominalistically 
acceptable terms) without introducing things that other interpretations would deny the 
existence of. A good QN is one that nominalizes Q without introducing entities any Qin 
would not presuppose.  
Now I’d like to introduce a dilemma for the core theory specification. Either there is 
a core theory or there is not. If there is a core theory, then it would, as mentioned above, 
minimally, need to capture the event-probabilities of quantum states. So, QN must give a 
story about the event-probabilities of quantum events in Q without presupposing entities 
that any Qin would question.  
                                                           
will explain them away by saying, for one example, that event-probabilities are merely epistemic as 
opposed to being physically real).  
13 
 
The problem, however, is this: each of the Qin’s either accept that there are 
fundamental event-probabilities in the world or they do not accept this. The 
interpretations that accept fundamental event-probabilities in the world presuppose some 
entities that the opposing interpretations would deny — namely, fundamental event-
probabilities. The interpretations that deny the existence of fundamental event-
probabilities deny the fundamental existence of event-probabilities by introducing further 
entities. For example, take Bohmian mechanics. Bohmian mechanics claims that the 
probabilistic nature of QM is merely epistemic. The reality is there is a guiding field or pilot 
wave which explains away the probabilistic nature of quantum events; there are no 
fundamental probabilities in nature. For another example, take Everettian mechanics. 
Everettian mechanics posits that we live in a multiverse and it is the multitude of universes 
that ground the probabilistic events in QM. It is not the case, for Everett or Bohm (or 
perhaps, for other QM interpretations) that event-probabilities are a fundamental feature 
of the world. At most, event-probabilities are features of the world on these interpretations 
only because they “fall out”, or are results of the more fundamental wave function. 
Therefore, Bueno’s interpretation criterion is asking for something that cannot be 
achieved (at least with regards to QM). It is asking, on this best specification, for a 
nominalization of a theory that gives a story about QM event-probabilities consistent with 
every interpretation. However, this nominalization would either have to accept or deny 
that fundamental event-probabilities exist (because it must give some story about event-
probabilities). To accept fundamental event-probabilities would be a failure of neutrality 
with respect to some interpretations (Bohm’s and Everett’s, for example). On the other 
hand, denying fundamental event-probabilities would require introducing controversial 
14 
 
entities (as when Bohmian mechanics introduces a pilot wave to explain away the seeming 
fundamentality of event-probabilities). Any seemingly successful nominalization will 
explain event-probabilities in a nominalistically acceptable fashion, but recall: any 
nominalization which introduces a thing into the world that other interpretations do not 
presuppose makes that seemingly successful nominalization fail. Some interpretations 
deny that nature is fundamentally probabilistic by presupposing further entities and others 
accept that nature has fundamental event-probabilities, and therefore, nominalization is an 
impossible task on this specification of the interpretation criterion.   
Eddy Chen makes a similar point when criticizing Balaguer specifically. He claims 
that “realist” interpretations (like Bohmian mechanics, GRW spontaneous collapse theories, 
and Everettian mechanics that “involve the quantum states as represented by a wave 
function, and not a function from events to probabilities”)22 cannot endorse the existence of 
event-probabilities as fundamental. Chen’s nominalization, since it crucially relies on wave-
function realism itself, would also fail Bueno’s interpretation criterion as Chen’s 
nominalization presupposes the existence of a real wave-function in the world (something 
that interpretations like van Fraassen’s modal interpretation would deny).23  
  Continuing the dilemma, suppose instead that there is no core Q. There are reasons 
to think this. Firstly, different interpretations differ in their formal features. For example, 
Bohmian mechanics contains an added formalism for the pilot wave and GRW adds a 
distinctly changed Schrödinger equation. And an addition of formalism is not merely a 
                                                           
22 Chen (forthcoming). 
23 However Chen’s nominalization is an example of a good nominalization effort on my own positive 
view offered in the next section, as he simply endeavors to nominalize the class of wave-functional 
realist interpretations and not the whole of QM. 
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difference in interpretation; it is a difference in theory. This is because on either of the 
dominant views of the structure of scientific theories, the syntactic or semantic views, a 
substantive difference in formalism would result in a different set of sentences that 
constitute the theory on the syntactic view or that characterize the models that constitute 
the theory on the semantic view. You cannot have an addition of formalism without a 
difference of theory on either of these major views of scientific theory structure.  
 Secondly, the different interpretations have different pictures of the concrete world 
and seem more akin to different (rival) theories than to different interpretations of one 
theory that represents part of a single world. For examples, Bohmian mechanics adds a 
concrete pilot wave to the world, and Everettian mechanics adds a concrete multiverse. If 
these interpretations have such a different picture of the concrete, physical world, why 
think they are mere interpretations of one theory, and not theories in their own right? As 
Myrvold writes: 
Two of the major approaches [“interpretations”], hidden-variables 
[“interpretations”] and collapse [“interpretations], involve formulation of 
physical theories distinct from standard quantum mechanics; this renders 
the terminology of “interpretation” even more inappropriate.24 
 
For these two reasons, we should not even expect a common core theory of QM.25 
If there is no Q, then, at best, classes of QM have a common core. The most Bueno can 
say with his criterion, then, is that a nominalization works (or does not work) for a 
particular class of interpretations. If there is no core theory, then no global, general 
criterion for the nominalization of QM, like Bueno’s, is available. Just because a given 
                                                           
24 Myrvold (2016), sec. 1. 
25 Tim Maudlin agrees. He claims there is no quantum theory, instead only a “quantum recipe” 
throughout his (2019) book.  
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nominalization does not work for a particular class of QM interpretations, nothing follows 
for the nominalizations of another class.  
 To summarize this section: Bueno’s interpretation criterion is underspecified in his 
own work. But, the most charitable specification of the criterion in logical space says that a 
nominalization of QM is good if it nominalizes core QM, and is silent with respect to the 
issues that the different interpretations disagree about. However, there are reasons to 
doubt the existence of this core theory, and if a core theory does not exist, then the 
interpretation criterion makes nominalization impossible. But, even if there is a core theory 
of QM, then a nominalization of the core theory would have to, minimally, tell a story about 
the event-probabilities in QM. However, that story would either invole an acceptance of 
fundamental event-probabilities or a rejection of them. If it involves an acceptance of them, 
then the proposed nominalization fails to be neutral with regards to interpretations like 
Bohmian mechanics and Everettian mechanics. If the nominalization rejects fundamental 
event-probabilities, then it should do so by invoking some further entities, in which case it 
then fails the interpretation criterion with regards to other interpretations that do not 
presuppose the entities invoked to explain away event-probabilities. Therefore, the best 
specification of Bueno’s interpretation criterion asks the nominalist to accomplish an 
impossible task. Perhaps this would not prove to be a strike against Bueno’s interpretation 
criterion if Bueno was a platonist, but Bueno himself is a nominalist who wants to engage 
meaningfully with proposed nominalizations.26 
                                                           
26 I take it Bueno does not want to say Balaguer’s nominalization fails because nominalization is 
impossible. Rather, Bueno seems to think that Balaguer’s nominalization is simply not a successful 
instance of nominalization. 
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 We can, however, nominalize classes of interpretations. In fact, Balaguer’s proposed 
nominalization is proof. So, instead of employing a global criterion as Bueno does, I think 
we should seek a much more piecemeal approach to nominalization. But what sort of view 
should we replace Bueno’s with that would govern piecemeal nominalization? In the next 
section, I offer a positive view on the relationship between interpretation and 
nominalization. 
IV. The Positive Picture 
I think Bueno has been looking at the relation between nominalization and 
interpretation in the wrong way. Instead of viewing a nominalization that is 
interpretatively neutral as the valuable sort of nominalization, I think that if nominalization 
is of any value, then it applies to all scientific theories and interpretations in the following 
sense: if we consider any scientific theory T (or interpretation I), and its nominalistic 
counterpart, NT (NI), provided it has one, then NT (NI) is, ceteris paribus, preferable to T 
(I).27 This is because NT (NI) does the same scientific work as T (I) and has the further 
theoretical value of ontological simplicity.   
Of course, most nominalized theories are much more ontologically simple than their 
abstract counterparts because they drop abstract entities. But this gain in ontological 
parsimony is procured at the cost of a less parsimonious ideology. For example, in our 
example of nominalizing distance relations, the nominalist must posit a few primitive 
                                                           
27  Why ceteris paribus? If two interpretations or theories, one platonistic and one nominalistic, are 
equal with respect to all of the theoretical values except ontological simplicity, then the simpler one 
should prevail. If they aren’t equal with respect to all other theoretical values (except for ideological 
parsimony, which I discuss in the body), then ontological simplicity alone will likely not give us a 
clear theory choice. The theoretical values I’m referring to here are Quine’s (1955): simplicity, 
familiarity, scope, fecundity, conformity to experience, and conservatism.  
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distance relations to capture all the relations that were captured by use of the real numbers 
(in addition to positing some concrete counterparts to the real numbers, in Field’s case: 
spacetime points). This picture of the value of nominalization that I am offering, admittedly, 
depends on weighing ontological parsimony as more important than ideological 
parsimony. However, I’m not sure how controversial this assumption is within this debate. 
The Field-style nominalist already apparently shares this assumption, given how 
nominalizations, like our distance-nominalization example, are carried out. And 
philosophers already unfriendly to robust ideology over robust ontology will simply 
disagree with my conditional above — that nominalization is of any value. My picture just is 
that if nominalization is of any value it applies to interpretations and theories in the way 
detailed here.  
For any theory (like QM) that has multiple conflicting interpretations, one would 
just have to rank conflicting not-yet-nominalized interpretations in order of 
plausibility/defensibility, then try to nominalize each; if the top ranked one has a 
nominalistic counterpart, then, ceteris paribus, that would be the best theory (or 
interpretation) choice. If not, then matters are more complicated because ontological 
simplicity might not trump the other (non-simplicity-related) theoretical values. 
For clarity’s sake, let me examine my proposed picture of what makes a good 
nominalization of a theory in light of some examples. Let us say we find out that the modal 
interpretation (Im) of QM is our best interpretation and the Everettian interpretation (Ie) 
is the second best. Instead of seeking a nominalization consistent with both interpretations 
of QM (as it seems Bueno wants us to do, and Balaguer seems to attempt), we should seek 
nominalizations of both interpretations so that we have a NIm and NIe. NIm is preferable to 
19 
 
the original, platonistic Im and NIe is preferable to Ie for reasons of ontological simplicity. 
Of the two, NIm is the best interpretation of QM we have full stop, because Im was the best 
not-yet-nominalized interpretation and it is also now nominalistic. Instead of thinking a 
good nominalization is one that is consistent or neutral with respect to all the 
interpretations of a theory, a good nominalization of a theory is the nominalistic variant of 
the most successful member of the stock of not-yet-nominalized interpretations.  
To summarize these points: Bueno maintains, on the best specification of his 
criterion, that a successful nominalization is one that nominalizes the core of a theory 
without introducing anything an interpretation of that core would reject or question. 
However, given the dilemma developed in the previous section, his criterion makes 
nominalization impossible. This shows his criterion is unemployable in any meaningful 
way against a proposed nominalization, and it hints at the fact that such a criterion might 
have been viewing the relationship between nominalization and interpretation in an 
unfruitful way from the beginning. I submit we should, instead, view nominalistic 
counterparts of each interpretation of a theory as competing against their platonistic 
match. We should rank the plausibility of each not-yet-nominalized interpretation of the 
theory, see if they have a nominalistic variant, and if there is a highest ranked 
interpretation that also has a nominalistic variant, then we should accept that 
interpretation because it is the most successful interpretation simpliciter and it also has the 
advantages of ontological simplicity. If our ranking of not-yet-nominalized interpretations 
is not so clear, then our theory choice becomes messier, as we may not want to accept the 
nominalistic counterpart of the fourth most plausible interpretation of QM just because it is 
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nominalistic. That is, instead of trying to nominalize our scientific theories by nominalizing 
all of a theory’s interpretations at once, we should instead seek piecemeal nominalization. 
V. Conclusion 
Bueno’s interpretation criterion claims that a nominalization of a scientific theory 
should be interpretatively neutral with respect to the scientific theory that is being 
nominalized. However, I think this criterion faces a crucial problem.  
My critique of the criterion asks for the proper specification of it with regards to QM. 
The most charitable specification of the criterion asks the nominalist to create a 
nominalization that is just of the core theory and does not introduce any entities in 
nominalizing the core that any interpretation would not presuppose. This best specification 
of the interpretation criterion makes nominalization impossible whether there is a core 
theory or not. This is problematic for Bueno’s criterion, because for it to do any meaningful 
work against proposed nominalizations, it should not rule out the possibility of 
nominalization from the start. If nominalization is impossible on the best reading of 
Bueno’s criterion, then this undermines Bueno’s interpretation criterion. 
After challenging Bueno’s criterion, I submit that our strategy for nominalizing 
needs to be rethought. Bueno thinks we should have a simple set of criteria, global in scope, 
that reject or deny whole sets of nominalizations. While I think Balaguer’s proposed 
nominalization succeeds to a degree because it works for some interpretations of QM, 
Balaguer also seems to want to present a nominalization that is consistent with every, or 
almost every, QM interpretation.28 Both dissenters about the possibility of nominalizing QM 
                                                           
28 Balaguer, (1998), pp. 120. 
21 
 
(like Malament, Bueno, Dummett and Putnam)29 and assenters (Balaguer) all seem to be 
pushing for an overextension; they all think that a nominalization should be consistent or 
neutral among all, or almost all, of the viable interpretations. Instead, I think we should 
look at the process of nominalization by seeking piecemeal nominalizations of our theories. 
Hartry Field, to his credit, did conceive of nominalization as a piecemeal project, and I think 
we should return to his modest and positive outlook on the nominalization of science.30  
This new positive picture I have offered on what counts as a good nominalization of 
a theory allows us to proceed with the nominalization of different interpretations of QM, 
while we wait for physicists and philosophers of physics to arbitrate among the best 
interpretations. When they have chosen a favorite, the nominalists will be there to give 
them the best nominalization of QM.
                                                           
29 Dummett, (1991). And Putnam (2012), especially pg,194-195. 
30 Steiner (2007) explicitly calls Field’s approach a “piecemeal approach”. Also, Dummett (1991) 
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